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In recent years, recognition that bogus self-employment is rapidly growing, not least because of the 
DGYHQWRIZKDWKDVEHHQFDOOHGWKHµJLJ,¶µVKDULQJ¶RUµFROODERUDWLYH¶HFRQRP\KDVOHGJRYHUQPHQWV
to search for ways to tackle this form of dependent self-employment that is widely viewed as 
diminishing the quality of working conditions. Until now, however, there have been few ex-post 
evaluations of policy initiatives that seek to tackle this phenomenon. Therefore, the aim of this paper 
is to provide one of the first ex-post evaluations by examining the outcomes of a 2016 legislative 
initiative in Romania to tackle bogus self-employment. Reporting both descriptive statistics and OLS 
regression analysis on monthly official data from August 2014 to August 2016, the finding is that 
while other business types and waged employment rates followed a similar trend to the years before 
the introduction of the new legislation, the number of self-employed started a negative trend after the 
new legislation was announced. After controlling for other indicators related to the economy (i.e. 
GDP) and labor market (i.e. employees, other companies, vacancy rates), the impact of the new 
legislation on the self-employed remains negative, offering reasonable grounds for assuming bogus 
self-employed was lowered by the new legislation. The paper concludes by discussing the wider 
implications of these findings. 
Keywords: Self-employment; bogus self-employment; informal economy; sharing economy; gig 
economy; Romania. 
1.   Introduction 
Over the past few decades, there has been recognition that formal, full-time and 
permanent waged employment is becoming ever less the standard employment 
relationship. Considering this employment relationship has been the key vehicle for 
allocating rights and social protection, the diminution of this particular form of 
employment relationship as standard raises issues for working conditions, rights and 
benefits. Not only are employees increasingly engaged in non-standard forms of 
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employment (e.g., part-time, fixed-term and agency) (Conaty et al., 2016; Gialis et al., 
2015; Hatfield, 2015; Eichhorst et al., 2013; Pedersini and Coletto, 2010; Forde and 
MacKenzie, 2007), which poses challenges for the operation of regulatory frameworks, 
but there is a growth in participation in self-employment, which is usually not covered by 
the umbrella of protective rights for the worker and responsibilities for the employer. 
Although protective rights are being gradually extended in many countries to protect the 
working conditions of non-standard employees (ILO, 2016), this is not usually extended 
WR WKH µVHOI-HPSOR\HG¶ZKRKDYHEHHQ WUHDWHGDVD UHVLGXDOJURXS ODUJHO\RXWVLGHRI WKH
purview of labor standards and regulation. This is because they are not perceived to have 
an employment relationship with their clients but rather, a contract for services.  
However, the growth of self-HPSOR\PHQW LQ JHQHUDO DQG µERJXV¶ VHOI-employment 
more particularly, whereby workers are self-employed but have a de facto employment 
relationship, if not de jure, because they only work for one employer, has led to a 
burgeoning literature on dependent self-employment (Fehringer, 2014; Kautonen et al., 
2010; Thörnquist, 2014). This has highlighted both the prevalence of bogus self-
employment and the precarious working conditions of those in such an employment 
relationship. The aim of this paper is to contribute to this small but rapidly expanding 
literature by seeking to advance understanding on how the growth in bogus self-
employment can be tackled. To do this, we evaluate a policy initiative from Romania, 
which might be transferable to other countries seeking to tackle the emergent form of 
self-employment, or what might be better termed disguised employment. 
To commence, the next section reviews the literature on bogus self-employment and 
the problems arising from the growth of this employment relationship. Identifying that 
despite an expanding literature on the growth of bogus self-employment and the resultant 
problems in terms of precarious working conditions, much less has been written on policy 
solutions to reduce the prevalence of this employment relationship, a new piece of fiscal 
legislation in Romania to reduce bogus self-employment is then reviewed. To evaluate 
the effectiveness of this legislation on reducing bogus self-employment, the third section 
introduces the methodology used, followed in the fourth section by an evaluation of the 
results. The fifth and final section discusses the wider implications of these findings. 
2.   Bogus Self-Employment: Its Impacts and Prevalence 
Although there is no widely accepted definition of bogus self-employment (Fehringer, 
2014; Thörnquist, 2014), most definitions refer to the legal and economic aspects of 
employment relationships that operate in the so-FDOOHG µJUH\DUHD¶EHWZHHQSXUHZDJHG
employment and genuine self-employment (Thörnquist, 2013; Kautonen et al., 2010; 
Ana, 2009; Jorens, 2009). Dependent or waged employment describes the relationship 
between an employer and an employee that creates reciprocal obligations and rights 
(Pedersini and Coletto, 2010; Ana, 2009; Jorens, 2009). The employee is seen as a person 
carrying out a specific activity/work under the supervision and authority of their 
employer for remuneration (Ana, 2009). Meanwhile, genuine self-employment covers 
economically active people providing services to one or more beneficiaries (Pedersini 
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and Coletto, 2010; Ana, 2009). While the employee works for the benefit of the employer 
under their authority, the self-employed person works independently for the benefit of 
their clients (Ana, 2009). The European Court of Justice underlines the relationship of 
subordination as the most important element distinguishing between dependent 
employment and self-employment (Jorens, 2(PSOR\PHQWH[LVWV LQ WKH µJUH\DUHD¶
when the self-employed provide services for an employer, not a client, and the work 
relation is in fact a relation of subordination. Therefore, bogus self-employment 
possesses the features of subordinate employment but is disguised as autonomous 
independent work (Eichhorst et al., 2013; Pedersini and Coletto, 2010; Ana, 2009; 
-RUHQV  %|KHLP DQG 0XHKOEHUJHU  $OWKRXJK WKLV µJUH\ DUHD¶ LV YDULRXVO\
referred to as dependent self-employment (Thörnquist, 2014, 2013; Eichhorst et al., 
2013), bogus self-employment (Hatfield, 2015; Thörnquist, 2014, 2013), false self-
employment (Thörnquist, 2014, 2013; Harvey and Behling, 2008), quasi self-
employment and hybrid self-employment (Gialis et al., 2015; Fehringer, 2014; Mandrone 
et al., 2014; Kautonen et al.DQGµLQYROXQWDU\VHOI-HPSOR\PHQW¶.DXWRQHQet al., 
2010, 2009), all terms refer to the worker being pushed by an employer to conduct the 
work on a self-employed basis.  
This is because by employing somebody as self-employed rather than in subordinate 
employment, employers are able to evade employment rights and entitlements (e.g., 
holiday/sickness pay) attached to the employment of an employee, as well as taxes, 
which leads this practice to be considered a form of social dumping (Fehringer, 2014; 
Thörnquist, 2014; Congregado et al., 2012) and also a type of precarious work. Indeed, a 
survey of employment experts in twelve European Union Member States under the 
project Precarious Work and Social Rights concludes that bogus self-employment is the 
second most common form of work associated with precarious work, after undeclared 
work (Thörnquist, 2014). Similar results are revealed by Eichhorst et al. (2013), which 
underlines that, even if atypical forms of employment such as bogus self-employment are 
not forms of precarious work per se, in most instances this tends to be the case. 
In recent years, bogus self-employment has moved further into the spotlight and 
become more prominent because of the technological changes transforming the nature of 
employment. The growth of online platforms and mobile device applications (apps) has 
sparked a debate over whether there is a need for a new, third category of employment 
relationship, somewhere between the traditional employee and the independent contractor 
(self-employed). The outcome has been a number of legal challenges alleging the 
PLVFODVVLILFDWLRQ RI µJLJ ZRUNHUV¶ DV LQGHSHQGHQW FRQWUDFWRUV DQG IURP ZKLFK D OHJDO
consensus has yet to emerge. This debate has important implications because these 
workers do not have the same protections as those in traditional employment 
UHODWLRQVKLSV$GYRFDF\RIWKHQHHGIRUDOHJDOFDWHJRU\RIµLQGHSHQGHQWZRUNHUV¶RIWHQ
draws on the example of Uber and Lyft drivers. This view holds that they are like 
traditional taxi cab or truck owner-drivers, except that their communication with clients is 
mediated through mobile device apps. Workers in this category would not be entitled to 
the full range of rights and benefits accorded to those in the standard employment 
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relationship. However, there are contrary views that Uber and Lyft drivers and other 
workers in comparable circumstances are de facto employees under well-established legal 
frameworks (e.g., working hours are measureable and a guaranteed minimum wage is 
effectively paid) and should be categorized as such and provided with the associated legal 
protections and benefits. 
Therefore, bogus self-employment has negative consequences for various 
stakeholders. Workers employed as bogus self-employed witness diminished social 
protection, career opportunities and job security (Thörnquist, 2014; Seely, 2010; Harvey 
and Behling, 2008). For this reason, it is considered a form of worker exploitation that 
HURGHV WKH µQRWLRQ RI HPSOR\HH¶ /LNLF-Brboric et al., 2013; Thörnquist, 2013) and 
destabilizes social protection by undermining important principles such as solidarity, 
quality and equity (Fehringer, 2014; Eichhorst et al., 2013). Meanwhile, employers 
contracting self-employed persons have less interest in investing in their training, which 
might lead to lower labor skills in the industries where the phenomena is widespread 
(Thörnquist, 2013). For legitimate businesses, moreover, an unfair competitive advantage 
is gained by the enterprises that disguise their subordinate employees under the status of 
self-employed to reduce their labor costs, resulting in wage dumping (Fehringer, 2014; 
Thörnquist, 2014, 2013; Seely, 2010; Jorens, 2009). Furthermore, government loses 
money because of reduced tax revenue, which otherwise could have been used for social 
protection as well as control over working conditions (Thörnquist, 2014, 2013; Eichhorst 
et al., 2013). 
Reviewing the literature on where bogus self-employment is most prevalent, the 
finding is that this disguised employment is more common in countries with weak trade 
unions and strong neoliberal views, with the United Kingdom representing the most 
prominent example in Western Europe (Thörnquist, 2013). Yet, even with strong trade 
unions, bogus self-employment is a difficult issue to address because, for example, when 
speaking about migrant workers, they are not willing to contact the trade unions under the 
risk of being fired, while the employment agencies and employers have an economic 
interest in hiding such employment relationships from the trade unions (see, for example, 
Sweden on construction and haulage industries in Thörnquist, 2014, 2013). However, in 
WKHSDVWGHFDGHRUVRWKLVµJUH\DUHD¶KDVDUJXDEO\EHFRPHLQFUHDVLQJO\FRPPRQDQGQRW
only across Europe but also the developing world (Thörnquist, 2013; Ebisui, 2012). 
Although it is recognizHG WKDW WKLV µJUH\ DUHD¶RI HPSOR\PHQW LV LQFUHDVLQJO\ FRPPRQ 
there is little rigorous analysis of the prevalence of this practice (Fehringer, 2014; 
Eichhorst et al., 2013; Thörnquist, 2013), with sectoral studies and/or case studies 
showing that the sectors more affected are construction (Fehringer, 2014; Thörnquist, 
2014, 2013; Eichhorst et al., 2013; Böheim and Muehlberger, 2006), transport, insurance 
and accounting, architecture and the creative sector (Eichhorst et al., 2013), and elderly 
care (Fehringer, 2014).  
Thus, even if tackling bogus self-employment is currently of high priority for many 
governments, little data exists at the moment about the spread of this employment 
relationship (Fehringer, 2014; Eichhorst et al., 2013; Thörnquist, 2013) or its impacts. 
Neither has there been much attention paid to how it might be tackled. Therefore, the 
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challenge for governments is to achieve a difficult balancing act of encouraging genuine 
self-employment given its prominent role as a driver of economic development and 
growth, but at the same time, deterring forms of bogus self-employment (Mandrone et 
al., 2014; Eichhorst et al., 2013; Pedersini and Coletto, 2010) and ensuring a fair balance 
between flexibility and security on the labor market (Leschke et al., 2006). Until now, the 
vast majority of initiatives to combat this phenomenon have focused on the question of 
how to correctly assess and classify the forms of employment relationship in legislation 
(Thörnquist, 2013; Jorens, 2009), which in a large number of countries across the 
European Union and beyond does not make a clear distinction between genuine and 
bogus self-employment. To achieve this, an increasing number of governments have 
LQWURGXFHGµWHVWV¶DQGUHJXODWLRQVWRDVVHVVLIWKHHFRQRPLFDFWLYLW\RIWKHVHOI-employed 
is independent or not, and to correctly determine their employment status (Eichhorst et 
al., 2013). For example, in the UK, there is a list of questions used in court decisions 
(Seely, 2010) as well as four tests, namely, the test of control, the test of integration, the 
test of economic reality and the mutuality of obligation, which are used to classify 
employment relationships (Jores, 2009; Böheim and Muehlberger, 2006). Meanwhile, 
what is employment in France depends only on the conditions under which the work is 
carried out, and it is not affHFWHGE\WKHµQDPHRIWKHDJUHHPHQW¶QRUWKHµZLOOH[SUHVVHG
E\ERWKSDUWLHV¶-RUHVTherefore, attention here turns toward a specific legislative 
initiative that has sought to develop criteria to define whether an employment relationship 
is indeed self-employment and also to reduce the incentives for intentionally 
misclassifying an employment relationship as self-employment. 
3.   Tackling Bogus Self-employment in Romania 
In Romania, which is the focus of this paper, the term bogus self-employment is not 
included in the Romanian Fiscal Code. However, in July 2015, a range of criteria were 
introduced to define independent, own-account activity or self-employment, and in 
January 2016, the level of taxation for self-employed was modified, while the level of 
taxation for dependent employment was preserved (see Tables A1 and A2 in the 
Appendix for details). As such, according to the Romanian Fiscal Code, an independent 
activity is defined as any activity conducted by an individual to obtain revenue, which 
meets at least four of the following criteria:  
(i) The individual has the freedom of choice of where and how to work, as well as the 
freedom to choose the work program;  
(ii) The individual has the freedom to have multiple customers;  
(iii) The inherent risks of the business are assumed by the individual;  
(iv) Work is performed by using an individual¶s assets;  
(v) Work is performed by the individual through the use of intellectual and/or physical 
skills, depending on the particularities of each activity;  
(vi) The individual is a member of a professional body, which has the role of 
representation, regulation and supervision of the carried out profession, according to 
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special normative acts regulating the organization and the way the profession in 
question is conducted, and  
(vii) The individual has the freedom to conduct directly the activity, with employees or in 
collaboration with third parties, according to the law.  
If after an inspection by government representatives such as the representatives of the 
National Agency of Fiscal Administration (NAFA), the minimum number of four criteria 
is not met, the work is considered waged employment and the taxes due are recalculated 
in line with the regulation in place for waged employment.  
In addition to the introduction of criteria for assessing whether a person is self-
employed or not, the financial incentives for being self-employed rather than an 
employee have been altered. In Romania, the self-employed were included in social 
protection schemes before the new legislation (European Commission, 2014). The first 
important change is related to the fact that starting from January 2016, all self-employed 
have to pay social contributions (i.e., those having another job, retired people and those 
having an income lower than the minimum wage are no longer exempted as they were in 
the previous period). Moreover, the income for which the self-employed wish to be 
insured is not optional (i.e. a minimum was mandatory before the new legislation, but 
above that level, the self-employed were allowed to choose the income for which they 
wished to be insured). The social contribution was split in 2016 into two fractions: for 
about one third of all net income, the social security contribution became mandatory and, 
to obtain full insurance, the contribution has to be paid for the remaining two parts of the 
overall net income (details about the tax level are provided in Table A2 in the Appendix). 
At the same time, the level of taxation for waged employment remained similar to 2015. 
To better understand how this legislation affected the labor market, Figure A1 in the 
Appendix provides an example of the net income earned by an individual if hired as an 
employee compared with the net profit earned by being (bogus) self-employed. As such, 
for a budget of 10,000 euros available during a year for a specific activity in 2014 and 
2015, the net income of the employee will be approximately 50 percent lower than the net 
profit of a (bogus) self-employed with both forms of employment covering social 
insurance. This means even if job security is not ensured, the high differences in the net 
income offer incentives to choose (bogus) self-employment.  
However, two scenarios are possible with the new legislation. If the self-employed do 
not have another job, are not retired and/or do not have an income lower than the 
minimum wage, then to obtain full insurance, the taxes due are similar to the taxes for 
waged employment. Thus, the economic incentive for (bogus) self-employment has 
vanished and taking a high job security risk is not worthwhile from the workers point of 
view. At the same time, for those having the self-employment status as secondary (i.e., 
having another job and therefore, having social insurance already paid), the new taxation 
level increases their contribution without offering them any additional benefits. This 
might discourage their willingness to declare their additional income. In sum, the new 
legislation modified the level of taxation for the self-employed and introduced criteria for 
defining whether an activity was self-employment or not and therefore, sought to make 
bogus self-employment less attractive from a financial point of view. 
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Based on this, the hypothesis here evaluated is that the changes in January 2016 in the 
Romanian Fiscal Code regarding the taxation level have led to a decreasing number of 
active self-employed (i.e., the bogus self-employment share has decreased since the 
economic advantages have disappeared). 
4.   Data and Methodology 
To evaluate this hypothesis regarding the effect of the new legislation on self-
employment, we use longitudinal data from August 2014 to August 2016, extracted from 
the Romanian National Trade Register Office and Romanian National Institute of 
Statistics. First, we analyze the prevalence of the active self-employed (monthly growth 
rate) against waged employment and alternative entrepreneurial forms (companies) 
during the two analyzed years in monthly segments, as well as the trends in the number 
of closed and inactive self-employed. Second, a regression analysis is provided to test the 
effect of the new taxation level on the growth of self-employment, when controlling for 
other indicators of the labor market that have been linked in previous studies with self-
employment (Eichhorst et al., 2013; van Es and van Vuuren, 2010; Golpe et al., 2008; 
Robson, 2003). Thus, the variables used in the analysis are as follows:  
Dependent variable 
x Self-employed (monthly growth rate): monthly growth rate of the active self-
employed, expressed as a percentage (own calculations based on data from Romanian 
National Trade Register Office, 2016a). 
Independent variables 
x New taxation level publicly announced: dummy variable with recoded value 0 for the 
period (months) before the new taxation level was announced and 1 for the period after 
(months) the new taxation level was announced. 
x Companies (monthly growth rate): monthly growth rate of the other types of 
companies (e.g. limited liability companies, joint stock companies), expressed as 
percentage (own calculations based on data from Romanian National Trade Register 
Office, 2016b). 
x Employees (monthly growth rate): monthly growth rate of the total number of 
employees at the end of the month, expressed as percentage. Employees at the end of the 
month represent the number of employees with a labor contract for a definite or indefinite 
period of time and with full- or part-time status (those with suspended work contract 
included) registered in the unit at the end of the reference period. The employees 
relocated abroad and those who hold more than one position, the main position being not 
in the reporting unit, are not included. Military staff and similar are excluded (Ministry of 
National Defense, Ministry of Administration and Interior, Romanian Intelligence 
Service, etc.) (own calculations based on data from Romanian National Institute of 
Statistics, 2016a). 
x Vacancies rate: represents the ratio between the number of vacancies and total 
number of jobs (occupied and vacant, excluding the blocked ones or meant for promotion 
inside the enterprise or institution), expressed as percentage (Romanian National Institute 
of Statistics, 2016b). 
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x Quarterly Gross Domestic Product at market price (QGDP): the main macro-
economic aggregate of national accounting, represents the final result of production 
activity for resident productive units, for a certain period (one quarter) (Romanian 
National Institute of Statistics, 2016c). 
Below, we report the findings. 
5.   Findings 
Here, we report the trends in active self-employment (monthly growth rate) against 
waged employment and the alternative entrepreneurial forms (companies), and the trends 
in the number of closed and inactive self-employed. To do this, we explore the trends in 
self-employment during the two analyzed years (i.e., the periods before and after the 
announcement of the new taxation level). Official records reveal that in late 2014, there 
were 392,104 active self-employed across Romania, corresponding to approximately 27 
self-employed per 1,000 permanent resident population of working age. However, self-
employment is not evenly distributed across Romania.  
To start to display the uneven distribution of the self-employed, Table 1 reports the 
regional variations. This shows that the number of self-employed is higher in the North-
West (68,652 self-employed), North-East (60,024), Center (54,706), South-Muntenia 
(52,110), and lower in the West (36,177), Bucharest-Ilfov (37,302), South-West Oltenia 
(40,616) and South-East (42,517). Examining the distribution across Romanian counties, 
the finding is that in late 2014, the most self-employed were to found in Bucharest 
(31,705), Cluj (17,880), Iasi (15,966), Bihor (14,749) and Prahova (13,174) and the 
fewest in Giurgiu (2,924), Ialomita (3,909), Calarasi (4,374), Covasna (4,462) and Tulcea 
(4,795). Nevertheless, if linked to the number of permanent resident population of 
working age, self-employment as a legal form for carrying economic activities was more 
common in Alba (47.1 self-employed per 1,000 permanent resident population in 
working age), Bistrita-Nasaud (42.9), Harghita (42.8), Salaj (40.1), Cluj (37.7), 
Mehedinti (37.5) and less common in Giurgiu (16.6), Galati (18.3), Ialomita (20.7), 
Constanta (21.4) and Calarasi (21.5). 
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Table 1. Active self-employed in Romania (number and density* per 1000 permanent resident 
population in working age at January 1st), by region (2014-2016) 
 
    
Region Dec, 2014 Oct, 2015 Dec, 2015 Aug, 2016 
Romania 392104 26.7 405777 27.8 396535 27.2 385667 26.6 
N
o
rt
h-
W
es
t Bihor 14749 36.2 15642 38.6 15358 37.9 15345 38.1 %LVWUL܊D-Nasaud 9297 42.9 9252 42.9 9158 42.4 9057 42.1 
Cluj 17880 37.7 18124 38.4 17729 37.6 17014 36.2 
Maramures 12745 36.2 13197 37.7 13036 37.2 12717 36.6 
Satu Mare 7576 28.6 7692 29.2 7533 28.6 7213 27.6 
6ăODM 6405 40.1 6635 41.8 6563 41.3 6498 41.2 
Ce
n
te
r 
Alba 11952 47.1 12083 48.0 11867 47.2 11451 45.9 
%UD܈RY 9885 23.4 10440 24.9 10068 24.0 9632 23.3 
Covasna 4462 29.8 4660 31.3 4568 30.7 4515 30.6 
Harghita 9323 42.8 9482 43.8 9324 43.1 8918 41.6 
0XUH܈ 10279 26.7 10893 28.4 10642 27.8 10460 27.5 
Sibiu 8805 28.6 9237 30.1 9025 29.5 8689 28.5 
N
o
rt
h-
Ea
st
 
%DFăX 10652 21.6 10985 22.3 10798 21.9 10414 21.2 
%RWR܈DQL 7480 25.7 7625 26.3 7513 25.9 7325 25.3 
,D܈L 15966 27.2 16417 27.4 16070 26.8 15473 25.5 
1HDP܊ 8343 22.0 8662 23.0 8542 22.7 8326 22.2 
Suceava 10650 22.5 10975 23.1 10825 22.8 10425 21.9 
Vaslui 6933 22.9 7163 23.2 7110 23.0 6948 22.4 
So
u
th
-
Ea
st
 
%UăLOD 5867 24.6 6150 26.2 5921 25.2 5831 25.2 
%X]ăX 6748 21.8 7161 23.4 7041 23.1 6936 22.9 
&RQVWDQ܊D 11119 21.4 11660 22.7 11352 22.1 11014 21.7 
*DOD܊L 7839 18.3 8051 18.9 7832 18.4 7535 17.9 
Tulcea 4795 28.8 5188 31.7 5111 31.2 5474 33.9 
Vrancea 6149 24.3 6508 25.9 6397 25.4 6421 25.7 
So
u
th
-
M
u
n
te
n
ia
 $UJH܈ 11047 25.6 11365 26.6 11050 25.8 10521 24.8 
&ăOăUD܈L 4374 21.5 4672 23.1 4613 22.8 4597 22.9 
'kPERYL܊D 10265 29.4 10663 30.8 10501 30.3 10855 31.6 
Giurgiu 2924 16.6 3036 17.3 2969 17.0 3081 17.7 
,DORPL܊D 3909 20.7 4147 22.2 4058 21.7 4070 21.9 
Prahova 13174 24.7 13564 25.7 13036 24.7 12255 23.5 
Teleorman 6417 26.3 6463 26.9 6351 26.4 6239 26.4 
B
.- 
Ilf
o
v
 %XFXUH܈WL 31705 22.0 32393 23.0 30852 21.9 28100 20.3 
Ilfov 5597 22.7 6049 23.8 5858 23.1 5497 20.9 
So
u
th
-
W
es
t 
O
lte
n
ia
 
Dolj 11547 25.3 12198 26.9 11850 26.1 11858 26.4 
Gorj 6722 26.8 6828 27.4 6687 26.8 6458 26.1 
0HKHGLQ܊L 7146 37.5 7015 37.2 6811 36.1 6669 35.7 
Olt 7616 25.5 7902 26.7 7780 26.3 7904 27.0 
Vâlcea 7585 28.7 7778 29.7 7608 29.0 7285 28.1 
W
es
t 
Arad 10463 33.3 10843 34.8 10668 34.3 10483 33.9 
&DUD܈-Severin 5380 24.4 5606 25.8 5514 25.4 5463 25.5 
Hunedoara 8575 26.8 8885 28.2 8704 27.6 8547 27.5 
7LPL܈ 11759 23.5 12488 25.0 12242 24.5 12154 24.5 
 
         
Note: * in Italic  
Source: own calculations based on data from the Romanian National Trade Register Office and 
National Institute of Statistics 
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Examining the changes in the number of self-employed between August 2014 and 
August 2016, and as Table 1 displays, the number of self-employed increased by 3.5 
percent in October 2014 (reaching 405,777 self-employed), whereupon it started to 
decrease by 2.3 percent by December 2015 (396,535 self-employed) and a further 2.7 
percent (385,667 self-employed) by August 2016. As such, after October 2015, the 
number of active self-employed decreased by 20,110. Similarly, the self-employment 
density decreased from 27.8 self-employed per 1,000 permanent resident population in 
working age in October 2015 to 26.6 in August 2016. This trend is not only valid at the 
national level but also for Romanian counties (Table 1). For instance, the number of self-
employed increased to 32,393 by October 2015 then began falling to 30,852 by 
December 2015 and to 28,100 by August 2016. A similar trend can be observed in the 
case of self-employed density. Indeed, some counties did not completely follow the 
national trend, witnessing an increase of self-employment in 2016 compared with 
December 2015 (Tulcea, Vrancea, Dambovita, Giurgiu, Ialomita, Dolj and Olt), but 
registered growth rates are very low (for instance, the number of self-employed increased 
from 2,969 to 3,081 in Giurgiu or from 11,850 to 11,858 in Dolj). 
Figure 1A. Inactive/Closed self-employed by region (average number/ month; Aug, 2014-Aug, 
2016): Before announcing the new legislation 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own calculations based on data from the Romanian National Trade Register Office; made 
with Philcarto, http://philcarto.free.fr 
Analyzing Table 1, the finding is that the level of self-employment in Romania 
started to decrease from October 2015. This is further reinforced when the inactive or 
closed self-employed are examined. Before announcing the new taxation level, some 
2,830 self-employed became inactive or closed each month. After the Romanian 
government announced the new taxation level (in October 2015), the average number of 
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inactive or closed self-employed in Romania increased by about 70 percent, exceeding 
4,800 inactive or closed self-employed per month. As Figure 1 displays, all Romanian 
counties display this increase in the average number of inactive or closed self-employed 
from October 2015 (Figure 1A compared with 1B). 
Figure 1B. Inactive/Closed self-employed by region (average number/ month; Aug, 2014-Aug, 
2016): After announcing the new legislation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own calculations based on data from the Romanian National Trade Register Office; made 
with Philcarto, http://philcarto.free.fr 
Moreover, before announcing the new taxation level (Figure 1A), 50 percent of 
Romanian counties reported a level of between 22 and 60 inactive or closed self-
employed per month. However, after announcing the new legislation (Figure 1B), only 21 
percent of Romanian counties reported a level of between 22 and 60 inactive or closed 
self-employed per month, 64 percent between 60 and 150 and 15 percent over 150. 
Among the most affected regions, Bucharest witnessed an increase from 282 inactive or 
closed self-employed per month before the announcement of the new legislation, to 609 
after announcing the new legislation, while Cluj increased from 150 to 220. Therefore, 
analyzing the two sections in Figure 1, the conclusion is that this trend of an increase in 
the number of self-employed becoming inactive or closing their operations was not 
concentrated in certain geographical areas, but rather apparent across the whole country. 
Nevertheless, the decrease in the number of self-employed between August 2014 and 
August 2016 does not appear to affect the distribution of self-employed people by gender 
and age. As Table 2 displays, self-employment is more common among men than women 
in all reference periods both before and after announcing the new taxation level (60 
percent of self-employed people are men but only 30 percent are women). 
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Table 2. Members of active self-employed in Romania by gender and age (number of persons, 
2014-2016) 
 
    
Distribution 
Dec, 2014 Oct, 2015 Dec, 2015 Aug, 2016 
(no.) (no.) (no.) (no.) 
Self-employed 392104 405777 396535 385667 
Members of active self-
employed 424389 437701 428371 416659 
 (no.) (%)  (no.) (%)  (no.) (%)  (no.) (%)  
G
en
de
r Female 168954 39.8 174194 39.8 169660 39.6 164004 39.4 
Male 255435 60.2 263507 60.2 258711 60.4 252655 60.6 
A
ge
 
- 29 68436 16.1 67074 15.3 64496 15.1 59282 14.2 
30 - 39 118398 27.9 120814 27.6 117429 27.4 112341 27.0 
40 - 49 115631 27.2 123516 28.2 122079 28.5 121957 29.3 
50 - 59 73333 17.3 73460 16.8 72034 16.8 69333 16.6 
60 + 48591 11.5 52837 12.1 52333 12.2 53746 12.9 
 
         
Source: data from the Romanian National Trade Register Office 
When examining the distribution by age, the finding is that in October 2015, 15.3 
percent of members of the active self-employed were aged under 29 years old, 27.6 
percent were aged between 30-39 years, 28.2 percent between 40-49 years, 16.8 percent 
between 50-59 years and 12.1 percent over 60 years old. The same pattern is observed 
after October 2015, when the new taxation level was announced. Interestingly however, 
even if Romanian legislation allows self-employed to have employees, very few choose 
to do so. This was the case before and after announcing the new legislation. More 
specifically, 405,777 self-employed had 437,701 employees in October 2015 and 385,667 
self-employed had 416,659 employees in August 2016 (Table 2).  
To better understand the trends in self-employment before and after the 
announcement of the new taxation level, Figure 2 reports the monthly growth rate of self-
employment between August 2014 and August 2016, alongside the monthly growth rate 
of all other companies (e.g. limited liability companies, joint stock companies) and the 
total number of employees. Figure 2 reveals that the number of self-employed in 
Romania registered a positive monthly growth rate between August 2014 and October 
2015, with the highest value (0.59%) in May 2015. However, immediately after the new 
taxation level was announced, the monthly growth rate of self-employed began a 
downward path. As Figure 2 reveals, the number of self-employed decreased by 0.29 
percent in November 2015, 2 percent in December 2015, 1.79 percent in January 2016, 
0.96 percent in February 2016 and 0.3 percent in March 2016. The upward path was 
resumed in April 2016, but the growth rates are very low (e.g. 0.14% in April, 0.03% in 
July 2016). 
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Figure 2. Monthly growth rate of self-employed, other companies and the total number of 
employees, in % (August, 2014-August, 2016) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own calculations based on data from the Romanian National Trade Register Office and 
National Institute of Statistics 
However, the number of all other companies (other legal forms) increased in the 
analyzed. Positive growth rates were registered each month, with larger increases being 
recorded in 2016 (e.g. 0.6% in March 2016). The total number of employees displays a 
specific trend, with decreases at the end of the year. However, except the end of the year, 
the number of employees registered a positive monthly growth rate between August 2014 
and August 2016. Unless considering the period between November 2015 and March 
2016, the three indicators in Figure 2 follow the same pattern (with higher fluctuations in 
the case of the number of employees at the end and the beginning of the year). In 
addition, positive growth rates for both the number of employees and the number of all 
other companies at the beginning of 2016 reinforce the idea that the decrease in the 
number of self-employed because of an economic downturn can be excluded. 
After announcing the new taxation level, the number of all other companies increased 
(e.g. 0.6% in March 2016). Moreover, the number of employees decreased less in 
December 2015 than in the same period in 2014 (0.42% compared with 0.46) and in 
January 2016 increased more than in the same period in 2014 (1.025% compared with 
0.92%). Thus, there are reasonable grounds to assume the closed self-employed (some of 
them bogus self-employed considering their quick decision not to operate under the new 
legislation) became either employees, migrated to another legal form for carrying out 
their economic activities or entered the informal economy.  
0.42 0.34 
0.12 0.27 
0.69 0.56 
-0.29 
-2.00 
-1.79 
-0.96 
-0.30 
0.14 0.03 
0.58 
0.35 
0.12 
0.60 
-0.46 
0.92 
0.60 
0.16 
-0.42 
1.02 
0.23 0.43 
-2.50
-2.00
-1.50
-1.00
-0.50
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
Self-employed Other companies Employees
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Table 3. OLS regression estimates for the impact of the taxation level on the sole enterprises 
  
Dependent variable: Self-employed (monthly growth rate) OLS 
Independent variables: Coefficients 
New taxation level publicly announced -0.817** 
 (0.301) 
Limited liability companies (monthly growth rate) -0.0648 
 (0.898) 
Employees (monthly growth rate) 0.584 
 (0.526) 
Vacancies rate (detrended) -2.542 
 (3.941) 
lnQGDP (detrended) 2.496** 
 (1.166) 
Constant 0.249 
 (0.335) 
  
Observations 22 
R-squared 0.540 
  
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant at * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Source: own calculations based on data from the Romanian National Trade Register Office and 
National Institute of Statistics 
To further investigate our hypothesis, we employ OLS regression (Table 3). The 
time series have been checked for stationarity before being used in the model. As such, to 
ensure stationarity of series, two variables have been de-trended, namely the QGDP and 
the vacancies rate. The results of the model specification tests are provided in Table A3 
in the Appendix. By using the Breusch-Pagan test (Breusch and Pagan, 1979) and Cook-
Weisberg test (Cook and Weisberg, 1983), we conclude that variance of the residuals is 
not homogenous. Therefore, we used the robust standard errors to address the 
heteroscedasticity problem as widely recommended in the literature (King and Roberts, 
2015; Williams, 2015). No first or higher order serial autocorrelation were identified by 
performing the Breusch-Godfrey LM test (Breusch, 1978; Godfrey, 1978). The mean 
variance inflation factor (VIF) shows that multicollinearity does not represent an issue for 
our model. In addition, a skewness and kurtosis test for normality (Jarque and Bera, 
 XVLQJ WKH DGMXVWPHQWV RI 5R\VWRQ  DQG WKDW RI '¶$JRVWLQR et al. (1990), 
shows that errors are normally distributed. As such, our model meets the OLS 
assumptions. The coefficients in Table 3 reveal a negative effect of the new taxation level 
on the self-employment monthly growth rate, confirming our hypothesis. Although there 
is no history of those closed and/or inactive self-employed for allowing us to investigate 
how many of these persons became employees and how many chose other forms of 
entrepreneurship (other type of company), or even work outside the formal economy, we 
 Tackling Bogus Self-employment 15 
 
 
15 
have solid evidence to speculate that bogus self-employment decreased with the 
introduction of the new legislation. 
6.   Discussion and Conclusions 
This paper has evaluated the level of self-employment in Romania before and after 
introducing new legislation in January 2016, which changed the taxation level and 
compulsoriness of paying social security contributions for the self-employed. That was 
preceded by another measure introduced in July 2015, which set seven criteria for 
determining if an activity is independent, or whether it is dependent self-employment and 
therefore, they have to pay the taxes required for an employee. 
The results show that, after the new taxation level was announced, the monthly 
growth rate of the active self-employed began a negative trend, while the trends of other 
forms of companies remained positive, which eliminates the suspicion of any economic 
change in Romania affecting self-employment. The negative effect of the new legislation 
on the number of self-employed is further supported by the regression analysis, which 
shows that even after controlling for other variables from the labor market that influence 
self-employment, the negative relationship remains statistically significant. At the same 
time, the monthly number of closed and inactive self-employed increased. If before the 
new taxation level, 50 percent of Romanian counties reported between 22 and 60 inactive 
or closed self-employed per month, after announcing the new legislation, only 21 percent 
of Romanian counties reported between 22 and 60 inactive or closed self-employed per 
month, 64 percent between 60 and 150 and 15 percent over 150.  
Thus, we have tentative evidence to assume the new legislation had a positive impact 
on decreasing the level of bogus self-employment in Romania. Therefore, the suggestion 
is that countries that introduce criteria for defining whether an employment relationship is 
bogus self-employment, and move toward equalizing the tax incentives for employing 
somebody as a waged employee rather than as a self-employed SHUVRQRQDµFRQWUDFWIRU
services,¶ FDQ UHGXFH WKH OHYHO RI ERJXV VHOI-employment. What is required now is for 
other countries to experiment with similar policies to Romania to tackle the growing 
problem of bogus self-employment. Before doing so, this paper needs to end with a 
caveat. In Romania, a problem that is apparent now is that the increased level of taxation 
of those self-employed who have another job and have social insurance covered (and 
thus, the self-employed status is secondary) means they might now opt to leave the 
formal economy because their net profit is affected and no additional benefit is gained. 
Therefore, the perverse consequence tackling bogus self-employment might have the 
knock-on effect of shifting some groups of self-employed out of the formal economy and 
into the informal economy. Indeed, whether this is the case will need to be monitored in 
future studies. However, it is for certain that with the rapid growth of what is variously 
UHIHUUHGWRDVWKHµJLJ,¶µVKDULQJ¶RUµFROODERUDWLYH¶HFRQRP\FRXQWULHVZLOOQHHGWRWDNH
action to ensure the growth of bogus self-employment and its associated poorer quality 
working conditions do not further expand. Hopefully, this paper, in providing one of the 
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first ex-post evaluations of a legislative initiative to tackle bogus self-employment, will 
provide some food for thought about the way forward for governments. 
Appendix A.    
Table A1. Taxes paid to the Romanian Government when hiring an employee, by employer and 
employee (2014-2016) 
            
Categories 
TAXES DUE 
2014 (Jan-Sept)  2014 (Oct-Dec)  2015  2016 
by the:  by the:  by the:  by the: 
a
 
b 
 
a
 
b 
 
a
 
b 
 
a
 
b 
(%) (%)  (%) (%)  (%) (%)  (%) (%) 
Social Security 
Contributions 
20.8* 10.5  15.8* 10.5  15.8* 10.5  15.8* 10.5 
Health Insurance 
Contributions 
5.2 5.5  5.2 5.5  5.2 5.5  5.2 5.5 
Medical leave insurance 0.85 -  0.85 -  0.85 -  0.85 - 
Unemployment tax 0.5 0.5  0.5 0.5  0.5 0.5  0.5 0.5 
Accident risk insurance 0.15-
0.85 
-  0.15-
0.85 
-  0.15-
0.85 
-  0.15-
0.85 
- 
Guarantee for 
insolvability of the 
employer 
0.25 -  0.25 -  0.25 -  0.25 - 
Income tax - 16  - 16  - 16  - 16 
            
Notes: * Standard working conditions; a Employer, b Employee. 
Source: Romanian Fiscal Code, Romanian Fiscal Code amended by Law no. 571/2003, 
Government Decision no. 44/2004, Romanian Fiscal Code amended by Law no. 123/2014, Law on 
State Budget 2014 no. 356/2013, Government Decision no. 44/2004 updated 2014, 2015, Law no. 
227/2015 regarding the Fiscal Code updated Oct 2016 
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Table A2. Taxes due by a self-employed in Romania (2014-2016) 
      
Categories 2014  2015  2016 
Income tax 16% of: 
a) net income, or 
b) income standards (applied to specific sectors; e.g. agriculture)* 
Social 
Security 
Contributions 
 For self-employed 
companies having a 
minimum income of 804 
RON (approx. 178 
EUR)** 
 31.3% of the income 
which the person wishes 
to be insured for  
 It cannot be less than 
35% of the medium 
gross salary of 2223 
RON or higher than 5 
times  
 The minimum is 31.3% 
x 35% x 2223 (medium 
salary) = 243 RON (54 
EUR)  
am
en
dm
en
ts
 
 For self-employed 
companies having 
a minimum 
income of 845 
RON (approx. 187 
EUR)** 
 The contribution 
decreased from 
31.3% to 26.3% 
 
 
am
en
dm
en
ts
 
 The contribution of 26.3% 
split in two fractions: 
 1. MANDATORY: 
10.5% of the net 
income (it cannot be 
less than 35% of the 
medium gross salary of 
2681 RON or higher 
than 5 times of its 
value). The minimum 
is 938 RON per year 
(approx. 208 EUR) 
 2. OPTIONAL: for 
those seeking full 
insurance, the rest of 
15.8% (applied to the 
same base). 
Health 
Insurance 
Contributions 
 5.5% of net income***    5.5% of net 
income*** 
   5.5% of net income*** 
        
Notes: * In very few cases income standards are chosen; ** Not mandatory for those having 
another job, retired people, and those having an income lower than the minimum wage; *** It 
cannot be lower than a minimum gross salary. 
Source: Romanian Fiscal Code, Romanian Fiscal Code amended by Law no. 571/2003, Romanian 
Fiscal Code amended by Law no. 123/2014, Law no. 227/2015 regarding the Fiscal Code updated 
Oct 2016 
Table A3. The Results of Model Specification Tests 
  
 OLS - Dependent variable: Sole proprietors (monthly growth rate) 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test p>0.0005/ Addressed by using robust standard errors/ White-Huber 
standard errors 
 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test p>0.1906 
Skewness/Kurtosis tests p>0.3307 
mean VIF (Variance Inflation Factor) 1.86 
  
Source: own calculations based on data from the Romanian National Trade Register Office and 
National Institute of Statistics 
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Figure A1. Hiring an employee vs. subcontracting to a bogus self-employed (2014-2016) 
         
      2014 
¼ 
2015 
¼ 
2016 
¼ 
         
Co
m
pa
n
y 
w
ith
 


¼ b
u
dg
et
 
fo
r 
a 
n
ew
 
ac
tiv
ity
 
 
Sc
en
ar
io
 
A
 
 
 Taxes due by the 
employer 
2,092 1,853 1,853 
  Taxes due by the 
employee 
2,360 2,432 2,432 
 
 Net salary for the 
employee 
5,548 5,715 5,715 
 
 
 
  
 
Sc
en
ar
io
 
B 
 
B.
1 
-
 
YE
S 
Social Security 
Contributions - - 1,050 
 
Health Insurance 
Contributions 131 144 550 
 
Income tax 1,579 1,577 1,344 
 
Net profit for the 
bogus self-employed 8,290 8,279 7,056 
  
     
 
 
B.
2 
-
 
N
O 
Social Security 
Contributions 600 592 
1,050 
[2,630]* 
 
Health Insurance 
Contributions 517 517 550 
 
Income tax 1,421 1,423 1,344 [1,091]* 
 
Net profit for the 
bogus self-employed 7,462 7,468  
 
x B.2.a ± with 
mandatory 10.5% 
social insurance (1/3 
of full insurance) 
  7,056 
 
x B.2.b ± with full 
social insurance 
  5,729 
         
Source: own calculations 
Hiring an employee 
Subcontracting to a 
bogus self-employed 
Members of self-employed: 
having another job, retired 
people, having an income 
lower than the minimum 
wage 
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